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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between strategies of cosmopolitan education 
intended to motivate citizens of affluent countries to care about distant others facing 
injustice, and injustices within the borders of these affluent countries. I argue that 
promoting justice within affluent countries and motivating citizens to act to address 
global injustices, are potentially complementary rather than competing projects. I 
make two claims. (i) Injustices within national borders can undermine the develop-
ment of cosmopolitan concern. (ii) National institutions delivering health and social 
care play a vital role in developing and sustaining affective dispositions necessary to 
care about the fate of distant others.
Keywords Cosmopolitanism · Motivation · Homelessness · Empathy · Sentimental 
cosmopolitanism
Introduction
Motivating individuals in the more affluent communities of the world to act to 
address global injustices has rightly become an important topic in the global jus-
tice literature. As a number of scholars, of varying degrees of sympathy for duties 
to address global injustices, have identified, these duties face a ‘motivation gap’ 
(Lenard 2010; Straehle 2016; Woods 2012). This is to say that, despite some agree-
ment over the existence of these duties, they struggle to motivate action—even in 
those who assent to them (Lenard 2010). In response to this focus on motivation, 
there has been an increased interest in the work that sentiment can do in connecting 
individuals to distant others, leading them to identify more readily with these others, 
and act to address the injustices that they face. At the centre of this ‘turn to affect’ 
has been a growing project of ‘sentimental cosmopolitanism’ (Long 2009; Woods 
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2012). Sentimental cosmopolitans argue that a cosmopolitan sentimental education, 
prioritising literature, narrative art and news media featuring sympathetic portray-
als of distant others, offers a promising means by which to encourage individuals 
in more affluent countries to care about the fate of these others and act to address 
the injustices that they face (Long 2009; Nussbaum 2001; Woods 2012). However, 
sentimental cosmopolitan authors have had little to say about the injustices that exist 
within the borders of these affluent countries themselves. At a time when levels of 
inequality and rates of homelessness are rising rapidly in many affluent countries 
(Burgi 2014; Rummery 2016), accompanied by an increasing nationalism and paro-
chialism within political debate globally (Goodwin et al. 2016; Posner 2017), this 
lack of discussion is particularly significant.
This paper addresses this omission, and examines the relationship between 
attempts to motivate the citizens of more affluent countries to care about the fate of 
distant others facing severe injustices, such as global poverty, and levels of injustice 
within the borders of these affluent countries themselves. I aim to show that the pro-
motion of justice within the borders of more affluent countries and strategies of cos-
mopolitan sentimental education aimed at motivating support for action to address 
global injustices are potentially complementary rather than competing projects. In 
order to do so, I defend two claims concerning the relationship between national 
injustice and cosmopolitan motivation—one negative and one positive. (i) Injustice 
within national borders can undermine the development of cosmopolitan concern 
and respect for the universal values that underlie cosmopolitanism more broadly. (ii) 
Institutions within national borders responsible for delivering health and social care 
play a vital role in developing and sustaining the empathetic or compassionate dis-
positions necessary for individuals in more affluent countries to care deeply about 
the fate of distant others. Therefore, sentimental cosmopolitans ought to be con-
cerned with addressing injustices within the borders of more affluent countries, not 
only due to the intrinsic value of doing so, but also as a means to develop and sus-
tain the affective dispositions necessary to motivate citizens to act to address injus-
tices elsewhere. The argument of the paper will focus on the context of the European 
welfare state, and the United Kingdom in particular. Because of the non-ideal nature 
of the theorising, it is necessary for the discussion to engage with a specific case, 
and the UK domestic context is the one I am most familiar with, both as a researcher 
and a citizen.
Before I begin it is necessary to make a brief comment on methodology. The 
questions the article addresses span the divide between the empirical and the nor-
mative. In these circumstances, as Emily McTernan notes, ‘empirical research has 
a role to play within political philosophy, and a role that does not involve merely 
paying lip-service to the possibility that empirical research could be relevant, but 
instead active engagement with that empirical research’ (McTernan 2014, p. 104). 
These are normative questions that cannot be answered without attention to empiri-
cal research; however, neither can they be answered by the employment of empirical 
methods, or attention to empirical research alone. To some the argument of the arti-
cle may feel somewhat speculative, whereas to others it may seem overly empirical. 
Striking this balance is difficult but necessary, in order to engage with normative 
issues of a non-ideal nature.
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Sentimental Cosmopolitanism
Sentimental cosmopolitanism is a broad body of theory. Primarily associated with 
the early work of Martha Nussbaum (2001), the sentimental cosmopolitan project 
has developed into a unified theoretical and practical project, with advocates in 
Political Theory (Long 2009; Woods 2012) and International Relations (Jeffery 
2014). Graham Long defines sentimental cosmopolitanism ‘as a certain configu-
ration of our sentiments and interests, through which we identify more readily 
with people regardless of where in the world they are’ (2009, p. 330). Although 
differing in some respects, the work of sentimental cosmopolitan theorists shares 
the following four features.
First, these theorists foreground the role of empathy or compassion, under-
stood as feeling for others—i.e. caring about their welfare—in motivating moral 
action (Long 2009, p. 317). This is a claim that receives support from the empiri-
cal literature on moral motivation (Prinz and Nichols 2010; Greene et al. 2001; 
Izard and Ackerman 2000). As a wide ranging meta-study on the topic notes, a 
weight of evidence suggests that ‘not only are emotions engaged during moral 
cognition, but that emotions…are in fact critical for human morality’ (Young 
and Koenigs 2007, p. 69). Although the exact terminology differs between theo-
rists, the sentiment that they discuss can be captured by Daniel Batson’s account 
of empathetic concern, understood as ‘an other-orientated emotional response 
congruent with the perceived welfare of another person’ (Batson et  al. 1995, p. 
1042). Second, these accounts share a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism, 
and argue that motivating action to address global injustices requires cultivating 
empathy or compassion on the part of citizens of the more affluent communities 
of the world for distant others facing injustices. Third, in order to achieve the 
extension of empathy or compassion to individuals and groups beyond national 
borders, sentimental cosmopolitans recommend a process of cosmopolitan sen-
timental education. In this process, a global focus within formal education, and 
exposure to sympathetic portrayals of distant others in literature and narrative art 
and news media, serve to encourage individuals in more affluent countries to care 
about the fate of individuals beyond national borders and act to address global 
injustice (Long 2009; Nussbaum 1996; Woods 2012). Fourth, although emphasis-
ing the motivational role of emotions, sentimental cosmopolitan accounts share a 
broadly Aristotelian view of emotion, where emotions are not simply blind urges, 
but contain rational elements, and can be evaluated for their appropriateness, cor-
rectness or fittingness (Tiberius 2015, p. 74; Nussbaum 2001, pp. 46–47). On this 
view, both reason and emotion are held to play necessary and complementary 
roles in moral life, with reason determining the content of our duties and emo-
tion motivating compliance with these duties (Long 2009, p. 330; Woods 2012, 
p. 40). Following Aristotle, sentimental cosmopolitans argue that as emotions are 
not blind urges, but contain rational elements, they can be educated, both through 
processes of habituation (Kristjansson 2014) and the influence of critical reason 
(Woods 2012). As Nussbaum suggests in the case of compassion, ‘since compas-
sion contains thought it can be educated’ (1996, p.13).
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This emphasis on emotion should not be taken to imply that sentimental cosmo-
politans consider arguments to have no useful role to play in motivating action to 
address poverty and other global injustices (Rorty 1998, p. 125). Rather, the rela-
tionship between affective concern for individuals facing poverty and moral argu-
ments to this effect is held to be a circular one; where affective concern allows for 
the motivational force of arguments to gain purchase, which in turn can deepen lev-
els of motivation to address global poverty. However, for this relationship to operate 
there needs to be at least a minimum level of affective concern present for the sub-
ject of the argument. As Woods argues, ‘moral argument has no purchase if it cannot 
latch on to something that is present in the agent’s motivational set’ (2012, p. 36).
The paper begins from the assumption that sentimental cosmopolitanism is 
broadly correct, and, as such, will not question the validity of these four claims. 
Instead, I focus on the neglected issue of levels of injustice within the more affluent 
communities, where projects of sentimental education are to be enacted, and their 
relevance for the success of the sentimental cosmopolitan project. In focusing on this 
issue, I do not mean to suggest that sentimental cosmopolitan is an entirely unidirec-
tional project, where the affluent are encouraged to care for ‘suffering distant others’, 
who sit without agency waiting for rescue, and whose cosmopolitan dispositions (or 
otherwise) are of no interest. Nevertheless, as a means to address global injustices, 
such as global poverty—the primary focus of sentimental cosmopolitan literature 
(Long 2009, p. 318)—the project necessarily places greater emphasis, at least in the 
short term, on motivating citizens of the more affluent communities of the world to 
act. This is not simply because these individuals have disposable income that may 
be donated to aid organisations acting to address global poverty or other injustices. 
Rather, as citizens of powerful nations that plausibly bear some responsibility for 
the current international order (Pogge 2002), that are generally internally demo-
cratic, these individuals are well-placed to agitate for political change to remedy 
global injustices.1 Finally, although this paper focuses on the literature on sentimen-
tal cosmopolitanism, my argument is of relevance for others who consider the exten-
sion of empathy or compassion to distant others to be necessary for, or conducive to, 
motivating action to address global injustices.
National Injustice and Cosmopolitan Values
Judith Shklar observes that ‘when justice and fairness do prevail they are undra-
matic’; rather it is experience of injustices, and the resulting suffering, that leaves 
the more significant emotional impression (Shklar 1990, p. 112). This negative focus 
is particularly important in examining how conditions within national borders affect 
citizens’ receptiveness to cosmopolitanism, as it is arguably our encounters with 
injustice rather than with justice that have the more powerful emotional impact. Tak-
ing its cue from Shklar’s observation, this section of the paper argues that injustices 
1 Moreover, these citizens may be to some extent complicit in an unjust world order that is plausibly 
responsible for much global poverty and other injustices.
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within the borders of more affluent countries are of particular relevance to the sen-
timental cosmopolitan project, as they can actively undermine the extension of cos-
mopolitan concern amongst the citizenry. I aim to show that tolerance of persistent 
visible injustices within national borders, by both fellow citizens and the state, can 
have a didactic effect, serving to undermine respect for the universal values that 
underlie cosmopolitanism. I illustrate this through the case of homelessness, a prev-
alent and visible injustice within more affluent countries.
Homelessness as Sentimental Miseducation
For strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education to be effective, sentimental 
cosmopolitan theorists argue that not only must individuals be taught cosmopolitan 
values, but that these values must also be backed up by corresponding affective com-
mitments in order for them to reliably motivate action (Woods 2012, p. 36). This is 
not to suggest that we must feel the affective force of these duties directly, but that 
these duties must be broadly supported by our affective dispositions. I want to sug-
gest that tolerance of injustices within a society can function as a sort of cosmopoli-
tan miseducation, serving to undermine commitments to universal values and the 
affective dispositions conducive to the pursuit of these values. Individual behaviour 
and institutional arrangements that ignore, or fail to address, instances of significant 
injustice within national borders can perform an expressive function, sending out a 
message that directly contradicts the universal values on which cosmopolitanism is 
based. This is particularly significant, because social psychology research suggests 
that descriptive norms—those deriving from observed behaviour—are often taken 
as a more authoritative source of moral instruction than injunctive norms—those 
communicated through didactic processes (Campbell-Arvai et al. 2014).
To illustrate, consider the example of homelessness, a particularly visible form 
of injustice that is tolerated to various degrees within the richer communities of the 
world.2 Tolerance of homelessness within more affluent countries sends a message 
at odds with respect for the universal values that underlie cosmopolitanism. Where 
behaviour is taken as authoritative, this may undermine acceptance of these values. 
As this is a work of normative political theory, discussion of this mechanism is nec-
essarily speculative. However, empirical research suggests that popular support for 
foreign aid spending (European Commission 2005) is correlated with low levels of 
domestic homelessness (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2017). Similarly, popular support 
for foreign aid is negatively tied to levels of domestic inequality (Chong and Grad-
stein 2006). While, it is important to note that correlation is not causation, these 
studies suggest that the mechanism outlined is, at least, prima facie plausible.
However, it is important to note two things here. (i) Homelessness is necessarily a 
complex phenomenon, and some homeless individuals and families exist out of sight 
2 It might be objected that some countries with relatively low levels of homelessness are highly com-
munitarian and display relatively low levels of cosmopolitan concern, as perhaps reflected in a lack of 
public support for public spending on international development or acceptance of refugees. I do not want 
to deny these cases exist; however, my primary focus here is British/European welfare states.
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in temporary and insecure accommodation. Nevertheless, I take homelessness to 
constitute a particularly visible form of injustice in most instances. (ii) I accept that 
some people may consider homelessness to be compatible with the pursuit of jus-
tice, or even to be a necessary condition for this project, especially those who favour 
a libertarian account of justice. The argument of this article does not directly speak 
to these people. However, I will also offer some reasons for thinking that actually 
existing homelessness is inconsistent with libertarian justice in, at least, the majority 
of cases.
The most direct mechanism through which this process can occur is by individu-
als witnessing this behaviour in person as passers-by on the street. Where individu-
als see others routinely ignoring homeless people when they encounter them on the 
street, this behaviour has an expressive function. From a normative perspective the 
most significant expressive aspect of this behaviour may be what this communicates 
to homeless individuals themselves, as where homeless individuals are ignored in 
person by more affluent members of their society this can undermine their percep-
tions of self-worth or claims to equal status. As Judith Lichtenberg notes, there is ‘an 
expressive aspect to such deprivations—they say something about and to poor peo-
ple in rich societies—that turns insult into injury’ (Lichtenberg 2014, p. 163). How-
ever, where homeless individuals are regularly ignored by passers-by, who avoid eye 
contact and refuse to enter into conversation with their less fortunate compatriots, 
this also plausibly communicates a lack of concern to other passers-by. The expres-
sive aspect of this behaviour is compounded by the sheer scale, as hundreds, if not 
thousands, stream past the homeless, who sit unacknowledged, in our great cities.
A second mechanism occurs through the broader tolerance of these injustices 
by society as a whole. Within democratic societies, a failure to address injustices 
though democratic processes communicates the same message, of a lack of concern, 
but on a larger scale. The communicative aspect primarily derives from a lack of 
action to address injustices, rather than successfully addressing injustices, as politi-
cal will does not always translate into successful action in the case of complex pol-
icy problems. However, homelessness is a severe injustice that has shown itself to 
be amenable to correction, where the political will exists (Gray 2018). Moreover, 
although Judith Shklar (1990, p. 45) rightly observes that we may tolerate certain 
injustices for the sake of other positive social goods, and in doing so express con-
cern or compassion for our fellow citizens, I take this mechanism to be implausible 
in the case of homelessness due to the normative significance of the basic goods 
homeless individuals are unable to access.
Thirdly, our own individual failure to address national injustices such as home-
lessness can serve to weaken our individual commitments to universal values. Social 
psychology research suggests that individuals are typically troubled by cognitive 
dissonance when their beliefs and actions fail to cohere, and that to achieve consist-
ency we often alter our beliefs rather than our actions. As Stoker notes, ‘Following 
Festinger (1957) psychologists suggest that people seek consistency between their 
beliefs and their behaviour. However, when beliefs and behaviour clash, we fre-
quently alter our beliefs instead of adjusting our behaviour’ (2014, p. 227). Accord-
ingly, regularly failing to address injustices encountered in person may lead to the 
weakening of individual commitments to universal values.
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By acknowledging the role of tolerance of national injustices in undermining lev-
els of motivation to address global injustice, this argument can address a compelling 
objection to sentimental cosmopolitanism more broadly; that many people draw the 
boundaries of their moral community at a level that excludes not just individuals 
beyond national borders, but many of their own co-nationals. To put this objection 
pejoratively: ‘How can we expect to encourage affective concern for people beyond 
national borders, when people are barely moved by the plight of the homeless indi-
viduals that they walk past on the street every day?’ However, what this objection 
fails to consider is that attitudes to homelessness are not fixed, and that current 
levels of tolerance of homelessness and other injustices at the national level play a 
significant role in compounding and entrenching the restriction of the extension of 
affective concern.
The three mechanisms I have outlined operate where behaviour that appears to 
tolerate injustice within national borders serves to undermine commitment to cos-
mopolitan values. However, I now want to suggest that the pernicious influence of 
such behaviour on our values may go further, conditioning the reach and motiva-
tional power of our moral concepts. In particular, I want to suggest that tolerance 
of homelessness and other significant injustices at the national level can impede the 
work that appeals to a shared humanity can do in motivating cosmopolitan concern.
In his seminal work A Common Humanity, Raimond Gaita argues that the lim-
its of our understanding of common humanity, understood as an affective notion 
delineating membership within our moral community—who we feel to be ‘one of 
us’ (Gaita 2000)—can be expanded or contracted through the patterns of behav-
iour prevalent within our society. To illustrate, Gaita offers the example of racism, 
arguing that where racist behaviour is common in a society this can serve to ren-
der a particular group of human beings invisible to the moral faculties of their fel-
lows (Gaita 2000, p. xx). The thought here is that identification as a member of this 
moral community is necessary for rational moral argument to gain purchase, and 
that rather than being co-extensive with biological membership of the species Homo 
sapiens, the limits of this concept are conditioned through behaviour. Tolerance of 
homelessness, and other significant injustices, within national borders can serve to 
drive a wedge between membership of the human species and identification within 
an affective understanding of shared humanity. Gaita gestures towards the exclusion 
of the homeless from within this identification, approvingly quoting the parsing of 
a line from a Spanish folk song by the French philosopher Simone Weil: ‘If you 
want to become invisible, there is no surer way than to be poor’ (Gaita 2000, p. xx). 
This exclusion is especially damaging for sentimental cosmopolitan strategies that 
aim to proceed in the opposite direction, bringing the affective recognition of shared 
humanity closer in line with the limits of the biological concept.
Objections
I have argued that tolerance of injustice at the national level has an expressive 
content that may undermine respect for cosmopolitan values, serving to limit the 
work that the bare fact of shared humanity can do in motivating affective concern 
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for distant others. However, it may be objected that this argument suffers from the 
following four significant flaws. (i) This argument ignores the role judgements of 
responsibility for suffering play in the development of affective concern. (ii) Direct 
encounters with injustices within national borders are typically distributed unevenly 
between the more affluent and less affluent members of society. Accordingly, this 
argument appears to suggest that the less affluent are particularly responsible for 
the motivational failure to address global poverty. (iii) Tolerance of homelessness 
within a society need not imply tolerance of injustice, as profound inequality of out-
come may be compatible with justice, at least on some conceptions. (iv) Perhaps 
exposure to homelessness does undermine cosmopolitan sentiment, but through the 
alternative mechanism that people exposed to homelessness within national borders 
tend to entertain thoughts of the form: ’well, we have our own problems here to 
worry about, so why should I worry about problems abroad?’ I will address each 
objection in turn.
The first objection claims that there is an important dis-analogy between how the 
situation of individuals facing global poverty and individuals facing homelessness, 
and other injustices, within affluent countries are perceived. There may be a popular 
perception that the homeless within affluent countries are in some sense responsi-
ble for their situation, failing to take advantage of opportunities available to them, 
whereas impoverished people in less affluent countries suffer due to political insta-
bility and a lack of functioning institutions and opportunities for employment. I am 
suggesting that this perception means that tolerance of homelessness within national 
borders need not imply a lack of affective concern for individuals facing poverty 
globally, not that this is an accurate characterisation of the situation of impoverished 
people in affluent countries.
There will be cases where this objection obtains, as we have to allow for the pos-
sibility that some people will be more motivated to address injustices at a global 
level rather than a national level, and that judgements of responsibility may play a 
role in their reasoning. For these individuals, the arguments of this paper will have 
little relevance. However, the significance of this point is limited, as such cases are 
not typical. Instead, we are more regularly confronted by either a greater level of 
motivation to address the suffering of co-nationals or a lack of motivation to address 
injustices whatsoever. Often, attributions of responsibility to those suffering sig-
nificant injustices within affluent countries will be misinformed or fail to take into 
account that poor choices typically only lead to homelessness for individuals who 
lack robust safety nets (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2016). In these 
cases, there is an important role for critical reason within sentimental cosmopoli-
tan approaches, not only in directing our motivation to address injustices towards 
the most effective solutions (Woods 2012, p. 40), but also in removing barriers to 
the extension of affective concern. Despite this, there may still be individual cases 
where critical reflection reinforces judgements of responsibility for suffering. Here, 
it is important to note that attempting to separate causal responsibility from moral 
responsibility does not provide an easy solution. As Bernard Williams argues, for 
most of us, most of the time, judgements of causal responsibility cannot be fully 
disentangled from attributions of moral responsibility, especially so at the level of 
affect (Williams 1993). However, these individual cases need not pose a serious 
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threat to my argument. Where support for policies addressing homelessness and 
other significant injustices within national borders is threatened by judgements of 
responsibility, these are general judgements regarding the group in question rather 
than judgements in individual cases. Accordingly, critical attention to broader pat-
terns of responsibility for injustice still represents an effective remedy.
The second objection argues that if regular experience of injustices within 
national borders is thought to play a role in undermining cosmopolitan commit-
ments, this suggests that those who regularly witness injustices in person represent 
a particular barrier to the extension of cosmopolitan concern. The worry here is 
that exposure to injustices within unequal societies is typically distributed unevenly 
based on wealth and class and other inequalities. As such, my argument appears 
to blame the less affluent members of affluent societies for the motivational failure 
to address global injustices. However, what this objection fails to acknowledge is 
that the patterns distributing personal exposure to suffering others within a society 
are neither random nor the choice of less affluent members of society. For exam-
ple, where homeless people are prevented from congregating in affluent neighbour-
hoods, this is due either to the result of political decisions that affect the more and 
less affluent members of a society unequally or, perhaps more typically, the unequal 
enforcement of the outcomes of these political processes. Therefore, responsibil-
ity for any negative effects of unequal exposure to injustices within a society, does 
not lie with the less affluent individuals themselves. Moreover, this objection only 
applies to cases where tolerance of injustices within national borders is witnessed in 
person. It does not affect the institutional component of my argument, where toler-
ance of injustice is reflected in a failure on the part of citizens to address these injus-
tices through democratic institutions.
The third objection claims that the profound equality of outcome evidenced by 
homelessness need not be the result of an injustice, for example on a libertarian 
account (as noted above). Although I take inequality of outcome to be compatible 
with justice in some cases, I do not think this applies in the case of serious depriva-
tions such as homelessness. Therefore, I do not agree with the substantive account 
of justice underpinning this objection. However, rather than defending this particular 
conception of justice I instead offer the following three responses. First, whilst some 
homelessness in affluent societies may indeed result from poor choices compatible 
with equality of opportunity, it is implausible to suggest that affluent societies cur-
rently exhibit equality of opportunity. Accordingly, actually existing homelessness 
is typically evidence of injustice, even on an account of justice that subordinates 
equality of outcome in favour of equality of opportunity. Second, there is signifi-
cant empirical evidence (Nishio et al. 2017) that treatable mental health issues are 
a major factor in individuals becoming homeless. This suggests that actual existing 
homelessness will not be compatible with justice as equality of opportunity. Third, 
my argument applies where profound equality of outcome is not understood as injus-
tice, strictly conceived, as a society that tolerates profound inequality of outcomes, 
including homelessness, is likely to be one in which cosmopolitan values struggle to 
gain traction.
The fourth objection states that exposure to homelessness within national bor-
ders does undermine cosmopolitan sentiment, but via thoughts of the form ‘we have 
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our own problems to worry about, so why should I worry about problems abroad?’, 
rather than through the mechanism I have outlined.3 The first point to note here is 
that it does not undermine my broader argument if thoughts of this form are respon-
sible for a lack of motivation to address global injustice, as this mechanism still sup-
ports the conclusion that addressing severe injustices (such as homelessness) within 
the borders of affluent countries is plausibly necessary in order to further cosmopoli-
tan aims. Secondly, I do not deny that both mechanisms are likely to be operative. 
However, there is reason to think that the former mechanism is less plausible, as it 
strongly suggests that people typically react to the homeless in a positive manner; 
for example as fellow compatriots who have fallen on hard times. Empirical stud-
ies examining our psychological reactions to the homeless significantly undermine 
this conclusion. Research from social psychology highlights that we typically react 
to homeless individuals with the ‘non-person treatment’—refusing to engage emo-
tionally or practically with their situation (Lankenau 1999; Anderson et al. 1994), 
rather than with affective concern. This view receives further support from medial 
prefrontal cortex studies within neuroscience, which suggest that many people fail to 
perceive the homeless as fellow human beings with the medial prefrontal cortex—
the part of the brain responsible for social cognition—failing to react in response to 
homeless individuals (Harris and Fiske 2006). It is beyond the scope of this article 
to decisively settle the empirical question in favour of either mechanism. However, 
I have suggested some reasons for thinking that the account I have offered is plau-
sible, and hope to have, at least, presented a novel alternative mechanism by which 
national injustices can limit action to address global injustice, that is of particular 
significance for sentimental cosmopolitan accounts.
Caring Institutions and Cosmopolitan Concern
Having examined the ways in which national injustices present a barrier to moti-
vating global justice I now turn to the positive side of the coin. In this section I 
examine how the pursuit of justice within national borders may directly further sen-
timental cosmopolitan goals by providing an environment conducive to the develop-
ment and maintenance of cosmopolitan concern. This is alongside the direct rel-
evance addressing injustices within the borders of more affluent countries has for 
cosmopolitans, as these injustices themselves constitute instances of global injus-
tice. Proponents of a cosmopolitan sentimental education have argued that educa-
tional institutions and the media have an important role to play in encouraging the 
extension of sentimental concern beyond national borders (Nussbaum 2001). This is 
highly important. However, this focus neglects the prior question of the conditions 
within a polity that are conducive to the development of compassionate dispositions 
more broadly. In the third section of this article I argue that social institutions that 
exist at the national level, in particular what might be termed caring institutions—
those dealing with the provision of health and social care—are vital for creating a 
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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compassionate citizenry, disposed to help not only fellow citizens, but also distant 
others.
The Didactic Role of Caring Institutions
Discussions of sentimental cosmopolitanism have tended to focus on the role of 
educational institutions, the media and popular art, both as a means of encourag-
ing emotional identification with distant others and extending our general capacity 
for responding to the sufferings of others with affective concern (Nussbaum 2001; 
Rorty 1998). Although these factors are highly important, I want to suggest that 
other national institutions play an important role in creating compassionate citizens 
disposed to respond with affective concern when confronted by instances of suffer-
ing, both within and beyond national borders. To be clear, narrative art forms and 
journalism are particularly important in expanding the constituency of individuals 
with whom we readily identify (Nussbaum 2001); however, other factors plausibly 
influence our tendency and capacity to respond affectively to suffering. In particular, 
I want to suggest that the existence of effective caring institutions within a society, 
such as those offering medical and social care, will be conducive to the development 
of compassionate citizens. These institutions can perform an educative function, 
teaching individuals to behave in a compassionate manner and to view other human 
beings in a certain light. As Raimond Gaita suggests, this contains both a negative 
and a positive element: ‘The struggle for social justice…is the struggle to make our 
institutions reveal rather than obscure, and then enhance rather than diminish, the 
full humanity of our fellow citizens’ (Gaita 2000, p. xxi). Having examined the neg-
ative aspect in the previous section, I now focus on the positive element.
There are three mechanisms through which caring institutions can perform this 
function. First, the values that these institutions are seen to embody can directly per-
form an educative function. For example, where hospitals offer high quality care 
to all patients, this can serve to reinforce the idea that all persons are owed certain 
basic goods regardless of wealth or background; something that, in the right circum-
stances, supports the teaching of cosmopolitan values within formal processes of 
sentimental education. Support for the effectiveness of this approach can be derived 
from social psychological studies suggesting that where injunctive norms—learnt 
through instruction and descriptive norms—based on the patterns of behaviour prev-
alent in a society conflict, the latter typically overwhelm the former (Campbell-Arvai 
et al. 2014, p. 469). This is not to suggest that attempts to teach values within formal 
education are unimportant, but that individuals will be more receptive to these val-
ues if they are seen to be embodied in the practices of the society in question.
Second, the behaviour of the individuals who staff caring institutions can 
perform an educative function, teaching compassion to those who encounter it, 
either directly—as the subject of the care, or indirectly—for example, when vis-
iting a loved one in a hospital or a care home. As theorists in the tradition of 
virtue ethics have argued, we learn moral values most effectively when we wit-
ness them in the behaviour of virtuous exemplars (Kristjansson 2014). This also 
receives significant empirical support from research in educational psychology 
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(see Kristjansson (2015) for a review of the evidence). The words and behaviour 
of individuals who work in caring professions may also have particular authority 
in teaching compassion. This is because the words and behaviour of these indi-
viduals will derive additional authority from these individuals’ lived experience 
of demanding situations that call for and test this particular virtue (Gaita 2000, p. 
xxxvi). Of course, where staff in these institutions fail to treat individuals receiv-
ing care (broadly conceived) with respect then the converse will apply. However, 
I do not take this to be typical.
Finally, being treated with compassion is typically thought to increase our own 
propensity to act compassionately. This insight is perhaps most associated with 
Okin’s work on the need for certain virtues to be present within the family in order 
for a society to effectively create just citizens (Okin 1989). However, as Matt Edge 
has argued, interactions within a society will also condition the extent to which indi-
viduals are disposed to respond with empathy or compassion to the sufferings of 
others (2016, pp. 115–119). This is supported by social psychology research sug-
gesting that being the subject of caring behaviour reliably leads to an increased sta-
ble disposition to act in a compassionate manner (Edge 2016, p. 116; Mikulincer 
et  al. 2005, p. 837). It is important to note that whilst the first mechanism only 
requires knowledge that caring institutions exist within a given society, the latter two 
mechanisms require personal experience of caring institutions to be operative. This 
is something that is a feature of most individuals’ lives, especially at the start of life, 
with children being exposed to health services in various ways; for example, through 
vaccination programmes or doctor’s appointments. Similarly, exposure to social and 
medical care is typically prevalent in the latter stages of life. However, many indi-
viduals are regularly exposed to health and social care throughout their lives, and 
parents are exposed to these services through their children.
Michael Ignatieff raises an important potential objection that applies to the latter 
two mechanisms I have offered, in his seminal discussion of the welfare state, The 
Needs of Strangers (1984). In this book, Ignatieff argues that a significant advantage 
of the institutions of the welfare state is that they function to mediate networks of 
giving and receiving within a society, such that those receiving care are not only 
claiming what they are owed but perceive themselves as doing so. This may be 
thought to undermine perceptions of individuals working within these institutions 
as behaving in a compassionate manner, and accordingly the success of the second 
and third mechanisms, as rather than behaving compassionately they are delivering 
what is owed. However, there is no direct contradiction here, as individuals can be 
owed caring behaviour, and, although the duties of individual citizens are institu-
tionalised and discharged via the welfare state rather than through private charity, 
it is the individuals working in these institutions whose behaviour is relevant on the 
mechanisms I have outlined. I take it that (these) individuals can, and do, behave in 
a compassionate manner when operating in a professional capacity, and that their 
behaviour be interpreted as such. Conversely, an emphasis on the care delivered by 
the welfare state as something that is owed potentially serves to reinforce the first 
mechanism (where these institutions perform an educative function), strengthening 
commitments to the idea that people are owed certain basic goods, such as health 
and social care, regardless of wealth or background.
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Sympathy and Security
Finally, I want to suggest that institutions promoting justice within the borders of 
more affluent nations can lead their citizens to be more receptive to strategies of 
sentimental education more indirectly, by increasing citizens’ perceptions of their 
relative security. This argument derives from Richard Rorty’s claim that strate-
gies of sentimental education will fail to gain purchase where individuals feel their 
own security is under threat. Rorty (1998, p. 180) argues that in conditions where 
our security is under threat our first concern is ourselves, and those with whom 
we immediately identify; accordingly, our horizons are narrowed, and we can less 
afford the time and effort to imaginatively engage with the lives of distant others. 
Ultimately, the claim Rorty is making here is an empirical one; however, it is a claim 
that I take to be intuitively plausible. As Woods notes in a paper defending the rel-
evance of Rorty’s security condition in understanding the causal role of environmen-
tal degradation in the under-fulfilment of human rights, ‘where one’s own security is 
threatened, one’s first concern is normally for oneself’ (Woods 2009, p. 62). This is 
a claim that can plausibly be broadened to include the security of the subjects of our 
partial commitments, such as close friends or family.
In endorsing Rorty’s claim it is important to acknowledge that vulnerability is 
a fundamental component of human life. Moreover, as Rousseau suggested (1991, 
p. 185), vulnerability is plausibly bound up in the extension of compassion. How-
ever, this does not imply that individuals cannot take reasonable steps to limit their 
own vulnerability. Neither does it imply that awareness of one’s own vulnerability 
will lead us to address the vulnerabilities of distant others rather than individuals for 
whom we already feel a great degree of affective concern. Moreover, both Rorty’s 
broader point and the inclusion of the safety of those closest to us within the security 
condition receive significant empirical support from social psychology research into 
the role of stress responses in blocking empathetic behaviours. As Paul Zak argues, 
‘nature assumes that if we are in dire straits ourselves, we can’t so easily afford to 
invest time and resources in helping others. High stress blocks oxytocin release’ 
(Edge 2016, p. 238; Zak 2012, p. 64).
If we accept that Rorty’s security condition is an important factor in determin-
ing the acceptance of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education, then this 
suggests that levels of injustice within national borders will directly affect the suc-
cess of sentimental cosmopolitan approaches. There are two mechanisms through 
which this process can occur. In a relatively straightforward manner, a failure on 
behalf of affluent societies to provide access to effective health and social care will 
directly undermine perceptions of security on behalf of those individuals unable 
to access this care for themselves and those closest to them. We should note that 
within affluent societies ill health (of various forms) and infirmity are typically the 
greatest threats to individual security. However, what is actually doing the work on 
Rorty’s account is not simply security in an absolute sense, but perceptions of rela-
tive security on behalf of individuals. Therefore, the existence of significant levels 
of inequality within national borders may also play a role in undermining percep-
tions of security within a society and, as such, the success of strategies of cosmo-
politan sentimental education. Empirical support for this broad claim can be found 
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in an extensive literature on the positive role of the welfare state in generating sup-
port amongst the citizenry for the admittance of greater numbers of refugees (Cre-
paz 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk 2007).
Conversely, where societies are highly unequal this can undermine perceptions 
of security on the part of all but the most affluent members of society. As previously 
noted, relative deprivation within a society can both have an expressive function, 
conveying a lack of worth to the less afluent, and translate into absolute deprivations 
in access to certain goods—such as self-worth or autonomy (Lichtenberg 2014, pp. 
163–164). This can lead to reduced perceptions of security, and to reductions in 
absolute security in some cases. Where inequalities in wealth translate into, or are 
accompanied by, significant power differentials this can directly affect an individu-
al’s ability to exercise agency over their own life. In some cases this can directly lead 
to a decrease in absolute levels of security. The effects on physical health of a lack 
of agency in the workplace, for example, are well documented (Lichtenberg 2014, 
p. 162; Marmot 2004). More typically, power differentials can undermine absolute 
levels of security through one’s relative ability to compete for certain scarce goods, 
such as the best quality health and social care. Significantly, where fellow citizens 
are taken as an individual’s reference group, inequality in access to advances in 
medical treatment may undermine perceptions of relative security to a greater extent 
than inequalities in access to medical treatment across borders. For example, where 
the more affluent members of society can access cutting-edge cancer treatments, an 
inability to access these treatments will undermine perceptions of security on the 
part of those who cannot.4
It might be objected that perceptions of security have more to do with the content 
of the media than the availability of adequate health and social care within a society. 
Here, national media might be thought responsible both for reinforcing perceptions 
that co-nationals are our primary reference group and devoting attention to high-
lighting inequalities within societies rather than between them. The tone of media 
discourse also arguably plays a significant role in how secure citizens perceive them-
selves to be. Where media reporting focuses on imagined crises in national insti-
tutions, for example, this is likely to undermine citizens’ perceptions of their rela-
tive security. There is some truth to this line of argument, as the media will clearly 
play an important role in shaping citizens perceptions of relative security; however, 
this should not be overstated. Perceptions of relative security are likely to bear some 
relationship to a more objective understanding of security, based on the actual con-
ditions existing in a given society. Although important, the force of this objection 
is further limited as media serving to increase perceptions of insecurity will only 
be regularly consumed by certain groups within society. Within liberal democracies 
the media typically offers a broad range of perspectives, and it is unlikely that these 
will all serve to reinforce perceptions of insecurity. We should also note the increas-
ing role of non-traditional media, operating across borders, both in undermining 
4 In some cases the converse will be true, with perceptions of security on the part of majorities being 
increased by the promotion of national injustices, targeting minorities where these minorities are per-
ceived as a security risk. For example, illiberal security measures targeting minority groups.
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co-nationals as an individual’s primary reference group, and potentially increasing 
perceptions of relative security through global, rather than national, comparisons.
Objections
It might be objected that the basic empirical claim I am making here is false, and 
that the existence of caring institutions within a society has little, or no, effect in 
increasing the propensity of individuals to respond to the sufferings of others with 
compassion or affective concern. A full empirical defence of this claim is beyond 
the scope of the article, but I take this to be an intuitive point, and have provided 
some support for this position in the empirical claims canvassed above. As noted 
previously, there is a clear link between being the subject of caring behaviour and 
developing a compassionate disposition (Edge 2016; Mikulincer et al. 2005). This 
link remains when we experience caring behaviour through welfare state institu-
tions (Kumlin 2004). Further empirical support for a positive relationship between 
welfare state institutions and levels of cosmopolitan compassion can be found in 
research showing a strong link between citizenship of a welfare state and support for 
policies to address injustices facing distant others. For example, studies by Noel and 
Therien (1995) show a broad trend where citizens of welfare states support higher 
levels of government spending on foreign aid. This is corroborated in a more recent 
survey by Kharas and Noe (2018), which shows that high domestic welfare spend-
ing correlates with high levels of international aid spending, although the direct 
role of public attitudes here is less clear. Most promisingly, the latest OECD report 
on the topic offers direct support, concluding that ‘welfare state institutions create 
public support for foreign aid’ (Zimmerman 2007). Outside of aid spending, fur-
ther empirical support for a link between domestic welfare states and public support 
for cosmopolitan policies is suggested in literature on the role of welfare states in 
generating support amongst the citizenry for the admittance of greater numbers of 
refugees (Crepaz 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). I cannot decisively settle the 
empirical case here, but these studies suggest that the model outlined in the article 
is at least plausible. However, there are two further potential objections that require 
answering in detail. (i) That these institutions play a role in creating compassionate 
citizens, but will typically lead to insular caring communities rather than the exten-
sion of cosmopolitan concern. (ii) That the argument advanced here is just too con-
venient, explaining away a real conflict at the level of motivation between global and 
national justice. I will address each point in turn.
In response to the first objection, I do not want to deny the existence of insu-
lar communities, where individuals show a significant level of sentimental concern 
for their fellow citizens but little concern for individuals beyond national borders. 
However, I take this to be a less common phenomenon than cases where societies 
fail to meet these standards both externally and internally. There is also some cor-
relation between strong welfare states and significant levels of public support for 
relatively high levels of international aid spending (Noel and Therien 1995). More 
significantly, this objection misunderstands the role I am suggesting for institu-
tions offering health and social care at the national level in increasing cosmopolitan 
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concern. I am suggesting that we need both caring institutions at the national level 
and strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. Where the former serves to 
increase receptiveness to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education, and the 
latter operates to correct a tendency for compassionate dispositions to be parochial.
It may be argued that the objection posed by insular caring communities is in 
fact more damaging than I have suggested, being grounded in our evolutionary biol-
ogy. Philosophers such as Kitcher (2014) and Heath (2012), drawing on evolution-
ary studies by Tomasello (2016), argue that humans developed an in-group concep-
tion of morality that allowed us to successfully co-operate and compete against other 
groups of humans. Thus, given that in-group morality has played such an important 
role in humanity’s evolution, the scope of moral concern may not only be limited, 
but necessarily directed towards members of particular in-groups.5
Even if it is the case that our moral concern for others requires a correlate out-
group for evolutionary reasons, out-groups need not consist of humans spatially dis-
tant from ourselves.6 As Arash Abizadeh notes, ‘[d]ifference need not refer to actu-
ally existing persons at all: it can refer to nonhumans, it can refer to characteristics 
not individuals, and it need not refer to actually existing things at all’ (Abizadeh 
2005, p. 57). Therefore, accepting this evolutionary picture of moral development 
need not undermine the plausibility of extending affective connections to distant 
others. However, there are good reasons for rejecting this bleak evolutionary picture 
in favour of a more nuanced view of the origins of morality, while still taking an 
evolutionary approach. For example, Buchanan and Powell (2018) offer an evolu-
tionary account of the origins of morality that allows for inclusivist moral progress. 
As they write:
[T]here is good reason to believe that humans, rather than being hard-wired 
for exclusivity, have a momentous moral plasticity—a capacity for both exclu-
sivist and inclusivist response—that is shaped by biology, culture, or (most 
likely) both. (p. 199)
On Buchanan and Powell’s (2018) account, exclusivist moral concern is a part 
of our evolutionary history, but only arises when ‘threat conditions’, such as scar-
city of food, are met. Outside of these conditions, inclusivist moral systems face no 
biological barriers. It is beyond the scope of this article to conclusively settle the 
debate between these differing evolutionary accounts of the development and plas-
ticity of moral concern. However, the plausibility of strongly exclusivist accounts is 
undermined by the many clear examples of inclusivism, such as the spread of animal 
rights and cosmopolitan concern—as evidenced by charitable giving beyond bor-
ders. At the least, Buchanan and Powell’s account shows that the argument offered 
in this paper is compatible with (at least) one evolutionary account of morality.
The second objection, that the model presented here dissolves the conflict 
between national and global justice, misunderstands my argument. I have claimed 
that the extent to which strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education will be 
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this objection.
6 Those unconvinced by evolutionary accounts of morality can ignore this objection and my response.
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effective will itself be dependent on institutions within national borders fostering 
an environment conducive to the development of compassion or affective concern. 
Rather than dissolving the conflict between national and global justice this is instead 
a case of accepting the hard conclusion that the promotion of justice within national 
borders is a necessary step in order for a cosmopolitan sentimental education to be 
effective. This is especially significant, as policies at the national and international 
level aimed at addressing global injustice require popular support in order to be 
effective, both to ensure that there is sufficient political pressure for these policies 
to be implemented and for the outcomes of democratic processes to remain stable.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between attempts to motivate citizens of 
more affluent countries to care about the fate of distant others facing severe injus-
tices, such as global poverty, and levels of injustice within the borders of these afflu-
ent countries themselves. I have argued that the promotion of justice within the bor-
ders of more affluent countries and strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education 
aimed at promoting global justice are potentially complementary rather than com-
peting projects. In order to do so, I have defended two claims concerning the rela-
tionship between national injustice and cosmopolitan motivation—one negative and 
one positive. (i) Injustice within national borders can undermine the development 
of cosmopolitan concern and respect for the values that underlie the cosmopolitan 
project. (ii) Institutions within national borders responsible for delivering health and 
social care can play a role in developing and sustaining the empathetic/compassion-
ate dispositions necessary for individuals in more affluent countries to care about the 
fate of distant others. Therefore, sentimental cosmopolitans ought to be concerned 
with addressing injustices within the borders of more affluent countries (not only for 
the intrinsic value of doing so), but as a means to develop and sustain the affective 
dispositions necessary to motivate citizens to act to address injustices elsewhere.
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